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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT-STATUS OF TAX 
CoURT-Petitioner instituted this action before the Tax Court for a 
review of rulings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determining 
deficiencies in the payment of his income taxes. The Tax Court held 
that it was not subject to the Administrative Procedure Actl and had 
no means whatever of bringing before it the entire record, so called, that 
was before the Commissioner. On appeal, held, affirmed. Judicial review 
of the "whole record" mentioned in section 10 (e) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act envisages, in the case of adjudication, a review of the record 
made in cases governed by sections 5, 7 and 8 of the act. Since these 
sections have been held inapplicable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
there is no basis for calling the Tax Court a "reviewing court" within 
section 10 (e). O'Dwyer v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1959) 266 F. (2d) 575, 
cert. den. 361 U.S. 862 (1959). 
Although the issue has lain dormant for ten years,2 doubt still exists 
as to the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Tax 
Court.3 The principal case holds that the Tax Court is not a "review-
ing court" under section 10 (e) of that act. But in dictum the court 
asserts that " ... the Tax Court is not subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act"4 i.e., that it is not an agency either. Although no case 
as yet has squarely faced the issue, several decisions contain dicta dis-
cussing whether the Tax- Court is an "agency" as defined by section 2 (a) 
of the act. The question was first discussed in Lincoln Electric Co. v. 
Commissioner,5 in which the petitioner was urging that the Administrative 
Procedure Act did apply to the Tax Court and that section 10 (e) per-
mitted courts of appeals a broader scope of review than had previously 
been allowed. The court expressly said that the act did apply to the 
Tax Court6 but, nevertheless, based its decision on the fact that the 
question presented was clearly one of law and therefore reviewable under 
either test. The next case of importance was Kennedy Name Plate Co. v. 
160 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1958) §§1001-1011. 
2 Cohen v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 394 was the most recent case to 
discuss the issue. 
3 "Without opening up a discussion of the Tax Court's status - the agency or court 
dilemma .••• " Wisconsin Mem. Park Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 
751 at 755. "Two such questions have already been referred to - the scope of review 
while the Dobson case was law, and the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act 
to the [Tax] Court. The former has been solved but the latter, while dormant, has not 
been definitely settled." Gribbon, "Should the Judicial Character of the Tax Court Be 
Recognized?" 24 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 619 at 626 (1956). 
4 Principal case at 580. 
5 (6th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 379, cert. den. 338 U.S. 949 (1950). 
6 162 F. (2d) 379 at 382. See also Dawson v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 
664 at 667. But see Anderson v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 870 at 874, 
cert. den. 334 U.S. 819 (1948). 
1960] RECENT DECISIONS 779 
Commissioner} involving section 8 (b) which provides in part that a 
petitioner may submit exceptions to the decision of the hearing officer 
which then must be ruled upon by the agency as a whole. The court 
stated that it assumed without deciding that the act generally did apply 
to the Tax Court, but held that section 8 (b) did not.s Reluctance of 
courts in general to face the issue of the applicability of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to the Tax Court is indicative of the doubts which 
judges have had.9 Writers who have examined this issue agree that the 
Tax Court is technically not a court,10 but they split in their analyses 
of congressional intent as to whether the Tax Court was intended to be 
included as an "agency" under section 2 (a).11 Thus, not until the 
courts or the legislature deal squarely with this issue will it be settled. 
Practically speaking, even if the act does apply to the Tax Court, few 
problems arise. The scope of judicial review of action by the Tax 
· Court, discussed in the Lincoln case and others, has been settled by 
legislative action.12 The court in the principal case looked at the 
problem of judicial review from the opposite side, holding that the Tax 
Court was not a "reviewing court" within section IO (e).1 3 Thus section 
IO, pertaining to the scope of review, is inapplicable to the Tax Court 
either as an "agency" or as a "reviewing court." Another area in which 
problems might be thought to arise is the area of the judicial procedure 
of the Tax Court.14 Two courts of appeals have faced this problem.11> 
In holding section 8 (b) inapplicable to the Tax Court the courts rea-
soned that since Congress had specifically stated in sections 2 and 7 
that nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act would repeal prior· 
statutory delegations of authority, the taxpayer's argument was invalid 
because Congress had previously by statute authorized the present pro-
7 (9th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 196. 
s 170 F. (2d) 196 at 198, followed in Cohen v. Commissioner, note 2 supra. 
9 For Tax Court cases arising after enactment of the A.P .A. in which the courts have 
side-stepped the issue of scope of review and the A.P.A., see comment, 37 GEO. L.J. 569 
at 571, n. 4 (1949). 
10 For a discussion of the history of the Tax Court, see comments, 37 Gro. L. J. 569 
(1949); 42 !LL. L. REv. 794 (1948); 18 OKLA. B.A.J. 1175 (1947). 
11 Lacie of evidence of congressional intent has led authors to opposite results. See 
comments, 42 !LL. L. REv. 794 (1948); 56 YALE L.J. 670 at 686 (1947). Compare comment, 37 
GEo. L.J. 569 at 573 (1949); Rubin, "The Administrative Procedure Act and the Tax 
Court," 26 TAXES 255 at 258 (1948). 
12 Congress has now given appellate courts the same power of review over Tax Court 
decisions as they have over decisions of district courts in cases without juries. 62 Stat. 991 
(1948), 26 U.S.C. (1958) §7482 (a). 
13 Principal case at 580. 
14 Section 3 is at present satisfied by the Tax Court. This section requires the pub-
lication of descriptions of its organization and descriptions of available procedures. Pub-
lication of statements of substantive rules and statements of general policy for guidance 
of the public are also required. 
15 Kennedy Name Plate Co. v. Commissioner, note 7 supra; Cohen v. Commissioner, 
note 2 supra. 
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cedure followed by the Tax Court.16 It would appear that the sound-
ness of this conclusion has put the problem at rest.17 
Despite the possible applicability of the act, and the early judicial 
indications to this effect, lawyers have not argued this question with any 
vigor during the past ten years. Although the apparent evolution of 
the Tax Court from administrative agency to judicial court is not yet 
complete, the absence of recent litigation as to the general applicability-
of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Tax Court as an "agency," 
the sweeping dictum in the principal case, and the petitioner's attempt 
in the principal case to bring the Tax Court within the meaning of 
"reviewing court" in section 10 (e) of the act18 seem to indicate the 
bar's willingness to accept, without serious question, the general in-
applicability of the act to the Tax Court.19 
James Cripe 
16 See comment, 87 Gm. L.J. 569 (1949). 
1'1 No cases have arisen on this point since 1949. Present Tax Court procedures a1so 
seem to satisfy §§5 and 7. Section 5 guarantees the rights to notice and hearing and 
prohibits persons engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions from participating 
in the decision in any adjuqication. Section 7 prescribes the powers and duties of officers 
pres!ding at hearings and the rules regarding burden of proof and evidence; it also 
provides what shall constitute the record for decision. 
18 In earlier cases, without exception, the petitioner was urging that the Tax Court 
was not a court but an "agency" within the meaning of the A.P .A. The shift of em-
phasis shown in the principal case seems indicative of the present attitude, generally, 
on the status of the Tax Court. 
19 "Despite some early dictum to the contrary, it seems fairly well_ accepted that the 
Tax Court, unlike administrative agencies, is not subject to the provisions of the A.P .A." 
Groman and Zarky, "Rules of Evidence in the Tax Court of the United States," 10 UNIV. 
OF So. CAL. TAX INST. 603 at 606 (1958). 
